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An Optimal Day-Ahead Scheduling Framework for
E-Mobility Ecosystem Operation with Drivers’
Preferences
Mahsa Bagheri Tookanlou, Member, IEEE, S. Ali Pourmousavi, Senior Member, IEEE, Mousa Marzband, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—The future e-mobility ecosystem will be a complex1
structure with different stakeholders seeking to optimize their2
operation and benefits. In this paper, a day-ahead grid-to-3
vehicle (G2V) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) scheduling framework4
is proposed including electric vehicles (EVs), charging stations5
(CSs), and retailers. To facilitate V2G services and to avoid6
congestion at CSs, two types of trips, i.e., mandatory and7
optional trips, are defined and formulated. Also, EV drivers’8
preferences are added to the model as cost/revenue threshold9
and extra driving distance to enhance the practical aspects of10
the scheduling framework. An iterative process is proposed to11
solve the non-cooperative Stackelberg game by determining the12
optimal routes and CS for each EV, optimal operation of each13
CS and retailers, and optimal V2G and G2V prices. Extensive14
simulation studies are carried out for two different e-mobility15
ecosystems of multiple retailers and CSs as well as numerous16
EVs based on real data from San Francisco, the USA. The17
simulation results show that the optional trips not only reduces18
the cost of EVs and PV curtailment by 8.8-24.2% and 26.4-19
28.5% on average, respectively, in different scenarios, but also20
mitigates congestion during specific hours while respecting EV21
drivers’ preferences. Moreover, the simulation results revealed22
the significant impact of EV drivers preferences on the optimal23
solutions and cost/revenue of the stakeholders.24
Index Terms—E-mobility ecosystem, EV drivers’ preferences,25





e,i,r Index for EVs, CSs, and retailers, respectively31
m,n Index of buses of distribution network32
t Index for hours33
Parameters34
∆t Time step (s)35
ηGUi /η
CH
i Efficiency of CGU/chargers at CS i (p.u.)36
η+e /η
−
e Efficiency of EV e’s battery in G2V/V2G mode (p.u.)37
γe Power consumed by EV e per km (kWh/km)38
Dt,e,i Shortest driving distance between CS i and destination39
of EV e at time t, (km)40
Ge EV e’s driver preference for minimum revenue in-41
crease in V2G operation ($)42
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Ke EV e’s driver preference for maximum extra distance 43
to lower the cost compared to minimum route (in km) 44
Ot,e,i Shortest driving distance between origin of EV e and 45
CS i at time t (km) 46
ρ−/ρ− Maximum/Minimum electricity prices offered by CSs 47
for V2G service ($/kWh) 48
ρre/ρre Maximum/Minimum electricity prices offered by re- 49





i Capacity of CGU/PV system at CS i (kW) 51
E
ESS
i Capacity of ESS at CS i (kW) 52
Ee Capacity of EV e’s battery (kWh) 53
Ei Capacity of CS i (kW) 54
E
CH
i Capacity of chargers at CS i (kW) 55
N
CH
i Maximum number of chargers in CS i 56
Pm,n,t/Pm,n,t Maximum/Minimum active power flow be- 57
tween bus m and n (kW) 58
Qm,n,t/Qm,n,t Maximum/Minimum reactive power flow be- 59
tween bus m and n (kVar) 60





i Maximum/Minimum SOC of ESS at CS 62
i (p.u.) 63
ρgast Natural gas price at time t ($/m
3) 64
ρWMt Wholesale electricity market price at time t ($/kWh) 65
∆V /∆V Lower/Upper limit of voltage deviation at bus m 66
ϑe EV e’s driver preference for minimum cost reduction 67
in G2V operation ($) 68
D̂Ot,e Driving distance of EV e to closest CS at time t (km) 69
ŜOCt,e SOC of EV e at time t if EV e charged or discharged 70
at the closest CS (p.u.) 71
a SOC target 72
b, c, d, f Cost of battery degradation parameters 73
bm,n/gm,n Susceptance/conductance of transmission line be- 74
tween bus m and n 75
HV Heat value of fuel on the operation of gas turbine- 76
generator (kWh/m3) 77
NEV/NCS/N re Number of EVs/CSs/retailers 78
SOCende SOC of EV e at the end of the day (p.u.) 79
SOCreqt,e Required SOC of EV e at time t for a trip (p.u.) 80
ζt,e Shortest driving route to reach the destination directly 81
from origin of EV e at time t (km) 82
V CS Virtual charging station 83
Sets 84
B,E,R, S, T, F Sets of Buses, EVs, retailers, CSs, hours, and 85
optional trip times, respectively 86
Variables 87
βt,i,r Binary variable for retailer r by CS i at time t 88
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∆θm,t Voltage angle deviation on bus m at time t1
∆Vm,t Voltage magnitude deviation on bus m at time t2
∆V̂m,t Voltage magnitude deviation obtained from the loss-3
less power flow solution on bus m at time t4
Γt,e,i/Πt,e,i Binary variable for CS i for charging/discharging5
EV e at time t6
ψt,i Binary variable for charging/discharging ESS at CS i7
ρ+t,i/ρ
−
t,i Electricity price offered by CS i at time t for charg-8
ing/discharging EVs ($/kWh)9
ρAGt,i Electricity price sold to the aggregator by CS i at time10
t ($/kWh)11
ρret,r Electricity price sold to CSs by retailer r at time t12
($/kWh)13
θm,t Voltage angle of bus m and time t14
ρ̂+t,e/ρ̂
−
t,e Electricity price offered by the closest CS to EV e15
at time t in G2V/V2G mode ($/kWh)16
Pm,n,t/Qm,n,t Active/Reactive power flow between bus m17
and n at time t (kW/kVar)18
PWMt,r /Q
WM
t,r Active/Reactive power purchased/provided19
from/by the wholesale market by retailer r at time t20
(kW/kVar)21
SOC0,e Initial SOC of EV e (p.u.)22
SOCT,e SOC of EV e at the end of the day (p.u.)23
SOCt,e SOC of EV e at time t (p.u.)24
Vm,t Voltage magnitude of bus m and time t25
X+t,e,i/X
−




t,i Charging/Discharging power of ESS of CS i at time28
t (kW)29
Y GUt,i Power produced by CGU/PV system of CS i at time30
t (kW)31
Y PVt,i Local PV generation of CS i at time t (kW)32
Y ret,i,r/Q
re
t,i,r Active/Reactive power purchased/provided33
from/by retailer r by CS i at time t (kW/kVar)34
I. INTRODUCTION35
RECENT advances in battery storage technologies, that36 lowered the prices, together with unprecedented aware-37
ness towards global warming, created a momentum for elec-38
trification of the transportation sector. While offering indis-39
putable environmental benefits and cost saving for consumers40
in the long term, a large penetration of electric vehicles41
(EVs) introduces concerns and challenges for power system42
operation due to uncoordinated EV charging in grid-2-vehicle43
(G2V) mode. This may lead to severe voltage deviations,44
power losses and overload of power lines and transformers45
[?], [?]. Electrifying transportation sector, however, provide46
new opportunities for the power system operators as well as47
the EV owners through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology. This48
is because an EV fleet is essentially a mobile storage that49
can supply flexibility and energy arbitrage services to the grid50
while creating a new revenue stream for the EV owners [?].51
Previous studies on V2G and G2V operation show that52
coordinated/regulated charging and discharging of EVs can be53
beneficial for the grid operation [?], [?], [?]. Also, the possi-54
bility of various business models is investigated for charging55
stations (CSs) operation that provide V2G and G2V services56
at competitive prices, e.g., [?], where EVs were supposed to57
select a CS. At the same time, CSs need to choose a retailer 58
to purchase energy while optimising the operation of their 59
onsite generation and storage assets. It, therefore, portrays an 60
ecosystem of EVs, CSs and retailers in which each participant 61
is seeking to maximize its profit or minimize its cost. It is 62
a challenging task to manage EVs demand, and CSs and 63
retailers operation in the ecosystem to achieve satisfaction of 64
all stakeholders. Thus, a day-ahead scheduling framework is 65
required to optimize the operation of the entire system while 66
fulfilling individual stakeholders’ objectives. 67
Numerous studies have investigated different aspects of this 68
problem, which are highlighted in Section I-A. Then, the 69
contributions of this paper are listed in Section I-B. 70
A. Literature review 71
The EV scheduling problem has been investigated in nu- 72
merous research papers from different perspectives in recent 73
years. Most of the literature propose coordinated G2V and 74
V2G operation mechanisms to minimize their impact on the 75
grid. For instance, a two-step EV scheduling methodology 76
was proposed in [?] to minimize EVs’ charging impact on 77
the distribution network. The optimal number of EVs to be 78
charged during each hour was determined in the first step and 79
the maximum number of EVs that should be charged during 80
the next hour was obtained in the second step. An iterative 81
two-layer optimization model was proposed in [?] based on 82
a mixed-integer programming to alleviate the negative impact 83
of uncoordinated charging/discharging of a large number of 84
EVs on the grid. In [?], an optimal V2G and G2V control 85
mechanism was offered to reduce the negative impact of EVs 86
on the grid while minimizing EV charging cost and losses of 87
the power system. The authors in [?] developed a two-stage 88
scheduling optimization model including EVs, thermal power 89
units and load demand. The day-ahead schedules of charging 90
and discharging EVs and thermal units were determined in the 91
first step, and charging and discharging schedules of the EVs 92
were obtained afterwards considering demand uncertainties. 93
A smart charging approach was presented in [?] for EV 94
aggregator’s operation to optimize power delivered to EVs 95
during G2V mode. Three different options were considered 96
based on electricity prices and charging power rates, and 97
the final decision was made by the EV owners based on 98
their waiting time preferences. In [?], a smart management 99
and scheduling model was proposed for EVs considering 100
desired charging electricity prices, remaining battery capacity, 101
remaining charging time and age of the battery as EV owners’ 102
preferences. The proposed algorithms have been developed to 103
optimize EVs operation in [?], [?], [?] and the grid in [?], [?], 104
[?], where the impact of CSs operation is neglected. Thus, 105
only one or two stakeholders were considered by neglecting 106
the impact of other players in the future e-mobility ecosystem. 107
Also, prices were treated as given parameters as opposed to 108
obtaining them in the solutions. 109
Another group of studies focused on optimal pricing of G2V 110
and/or V2G services in the future e-mobility ecosystem. For 111
example, an optimal pricing scheme was proposed in [?] to 112
coordinate the charging processes of EVs. Another model was 113
developed in [?] for managing EVs in a public CS network 114
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through differentiated services including optimal pricing and1
routing. In their method, CSs were assigned to EVs based2
on their energy demand and their traveling preferences (i.e.,3
which stations they are willing to visit) to manage waiting time4
and electricity prices. In [?], a pricing scheme for charging5
an EV was proposed including two optimization problems to6
maximize social welfare of CSs and EV owners. In [?], an7
incentive-based scheduling of EV charging among multiple8
CSs was studied based on game theory. It aimed to minimize9
the total electricity cost of the utility and to maximize the10
payoff of each station. In [?], a pricing methodology for CSs11
was developed to facilitate consumption of renewable genera-12
tion. The selection of CSs by EV owners was modeled based13
on the charging prices, driving distance to CSs and traffic14
congestion information. In [?], an algorithm was proposed to15
schedule EVs for G2V and V2G services according to EV16
driving demand while planning the time and location of the17
services. The scheduling was based on Time-of-Use pricing.18
In [?], a CS operation mechanism was developed that jointly19
optimized pricing, charging scheduling and admission of a20
single CS. CS’s profit was maximized by reducing waiting21
time at the CS. Unfortunately, the impact of retailers’ operation22
and prices is disregarded in this group of literature, which is23
quite important as the major provider of electricity and thus24
a price maker. Also, V2G prices have not been determined in25
the proposed algorithms.26
Game theory has also been used in several studies on27
this subject, which facilitates price calculation. A day-ahead28
G2V scheduling was proposed in [?] based on an aggregative29
game model accounting for the interaction between the EV30
charging demand and its impact on the electricity prices. In31
[?], a Stackelberg game was developed, where CSs (as leaders)32
offered their G2V prices to EVs (as followers), who then select33
CSs based on prices, travel distances, and expected waiting34
times at CSs. In [?], an optimization framework based on non-35
cooperative game was developed using mixed-integer linear36
programming to allocate CSs to EVs for G2V operation in37
order to minimize EV waiting times. In these papers, the38
proposed algorithms can only solve the scheduling problem39
for a subset of the players in future e-mobility ecosystem,40
which may lead to sub-optimal solutions, thus lower public41
acceptance.42
Several papers proposed EV scheduling algorithms to pro-43
vide various services to the grid. A decentralized algorithm44
was proposed to optimally schedule EV charging and discharg-45
ing to fulfil load shifting in [?], [?]. In [?], an energy manage-46
ment problem was formulated using dynamic programming to47
minimize the daily energy cost of plug-in hybrid EVs. In that48
study, an optimal charging scheme for plug-in hybrid EVs was49
developed to shave the peak load and flatten the overall load50
profile from the distribution system operator’s perspective.51
Nevertheless, the CSs operation has not been investigated in52
these studies.53
Multi-objective formulation has also been used in the liter-54
ature for the EV scheduling problem. In [?], a day-ahead co-55
optimization problem was proposed to minimize the negative56
effects of plug-in EVs on the distribution network by minimiz-57
ing the cost of energy losses and transformer operation cost,58
while managing reactive and active powers. In [?], a multi- 59
objective optimization problem was proposed to co-optimize 60
customer and system operator objectives. The proposed model 61
controlled the peak load from the system operator’s perspective 62
and optimized EVs’ costs/revenues and the battery degradation 63
cost from the EVs’ perspective. In [?], a multi-objective 64
optimization problem was presented to obtain optimal charging 65
schedule of EVs regarding the operation of transportation 66
network, power network, and CSs. In [?], a multi-objective 67
optimization was developed for scheduling EV’s V2G and 68
G2V operation. Co-optimization of electricity cost, battery 69
degradation, grid net exchange and CO2 emissions has been 70
performed. It can be seen that the proposed multi-objective 71
methods only optimize one stakeholder’s operation without ac- 72
counting for the impact of optimal operation of the other ones. 73
Also, the G2V and V2G prices for different stakeholders have 74
not been obtained in the proposed multi-objective frameworks. 75
Other potential challenges related to multi-objective problems 76
are the dilemma over determining appropriate weights for 77
different objectives and the tractability of a larger optimization 78
problem that should be solved in a single shot [?]. 79
A careful review of the literature shows that the proposed 80
algorithms find the best CS based on the EV drivers’ prefer- 81
ences such as minimum driving distance [?], minimum cost 82
of G2V, maximum revenue of V2G [?], and minimum waiting 83
time in CSs [?], [?] without considering diverse attitude of EV 84
drivers to economic incentives. In addition, the EV drivers may 85
react differently to extra driving distances required for cheaper 86
(more expensive) G2V (V2G) services. In other words, EV 87
drivers are modelled fully rational in the literature, which may 88
jeopardize the EV drivers’ welfare. In summary, an extensive 89
review of the existing studies indicates the following gaps in 90
knowledge: 91
• A whole system approach has not been adopted to 92
optimize major stakeholders operation in the ecosystem. 93
Also, the mutual impacts of the stakeholders are ignored 94
by optimizing each stakeholder’s operation individually; 95
• The role of retailers on the operation of the EV’s schedul- 96
ing system and prices has not been investigated; 97
• They do not offer a mechanism to determine V2G prices; 98
• In the proposed algorithms, some of the practical aspects 99
of EV scheduling, e.g., EV drivers’ preferences and G2V 100
and V2G operation outside of declared trips, were not 101
considered. 102
B. Main Contributions 103
In this paper, a comprehensive day-ahead scheduling frame- 104
work is developed for an e-mobility ecosystem including 105
EVs, CSs, and retailers (as the three major stakeholders) 106
for V2G and G2V operation. In an attempt to improve the 107
practical aspects of the EV scheduling formulation, we propose 108
two major improvements. First, the optional trips (besides 109
mandatory trips) are introduced in the formulation to provide 110
opportunities for G2V and V2G services beyond mandatory 111
trips, explained in Section II-A. As we will see in the sim- 112
ulation studies in Section IV-A, it will enhance convenience 113
and flexibility in EV scheduling and provide an opportunity to 114
encourage more G2V and V2G participation. Second, two new 115
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parameters, namely driver’s cost/revenue threshold and driver’s1
route preference, are defined and formulated to model diverse2
reaction of EV drivers to economic incentives, as described in3
Section II-B. The G2V and V2G prices are also obtained by4
considering the mutual impact of the stakeholders through an5
iterative process, which is presented in Section II-C.6
The main contributions of this paper are:7
1) Formulating and solving a three-layer optimiza-8
tion problem: A comprehensive model is developed9
to consider the operation of all stakeholders in the10
future e-mobility ecosystem as a three-layer optimization11
problem. An iterative solution is proposed to solve the12
problem as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game.13
2) Optional trips: This provision is expected to improve14
the practical aspects of EV scheduling problem and15
provides an opportunity for EV drivers to take advan-16
tage of cheaper G2V prices and more expensive V2G17
prices beyond mandatory trips’ timeframe. The effect of18
optional trips on the cost/revenue of three stakeholders,19
CS congestion and PV spillage are investigated.20
3) Preferences of EV drivers: Two important practical21
aspects of the EV scheduling problem are considered by22
adding new constraints in order to model economically-23
irrational decisions taken by the EV drivers in response24
to economic incentives. These constraints are driver’s25
cost/revenue threshold and driver’s route preference.26
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II27
presents problem definition and describes the structure of the28
proposed G2V and V2G framework including the three stake-29
holders. It is followed by the proposed three-layer optimization30
formulation in Section III. In Section IV, two ecosystems are31
proposed for simulation and a series of studies are carried32
out to show the effectiveness of the proposed framework.33
Simulation results are discussed and the paper is concluded34
in Section V.35
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION36
This paper presents a day-ahead scheduling framework for37
e-mobility ecosystems including EVs, CSs, and retailers as38
three major players. In the proposed ecosystem, illustrated39
in Fig 1, there are multiple retailers selling electricity to40
CSs from the wholesale electricity market. The CSs are the41
charging stations located in the scheduling area. They operate42
at the distribution system to serve EVs during G2V and V2G43
operation. For the sake of completeness, each CS is assumed44
to own and operate an onsite small gas turbine/diesel generator45
as a conventional generation unit (CGU), photovoltaic (PV),46
and energy storage system (ESS), which can be used to47
supply electricity to EVs during G2V operation. Also, CSs48
purchase V2G services from EVs and sell it in the wholesale49
electricity market through aggregators. It is assumed that50
conventional retailers are not allowed to sell electricity to the51
wholesale market (i.e., simultaneous buying and selling energy52
are prohibited).53
In order to facilitate cost-effective operation of the stake-54
holders, to mitigate congestion and PV curtailment at CSs,55
and to consider EV drivers’ preferences, two kinds of trips56
and extra constraints are defined and formulated in this paper,57








































































































Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the future e-mobility ecosystem.
A. Different types of trips 60
As shown in Fig. 2, EVs can have two kinds of trips 61
during a typical day: mandatory trip and optional trip. Each 62
EV can have multiple mandatory trips with known departure 63
time, origin, and destination for each trip. These trips will 64
be fulfilled at any cost. In other times, e.g., between two 65
mandatory trips, EV drivers may have time for G2V and/or 66
V2G services if the prices are right. This is the basis for what 67
is called optional trip in this study. An optional trip, as opposed 68
to mandatory trip, provides a chance for EV drivers to take 69
advantage of cheap G2V or expensive V2G services outside of 70
the mandatory trip time frame; thus reduce their overall cost. 71
Overall, EVs with a known location and initial state of charge 72
(SOC) seek a G2V and V2G plan for the combined mandatory 73
and optional trips such that it minimizes their overall cost 74
while respecting their preferences. The optional trips also help 75
CSs to sell their excess energy, to provide services to the upper 76
grid that generates revenue for EVs, and to enable CSs to 77
alleviate congestion. 78
The scheduling problem is solved for the entire day ahead. 79
EV drivers submit their plans for mandatory and optional trips 80
to the scheduling centre (which could be a cloud platform with 81
monthly subscription fee) a day before the scheduling day. As 82
shown in Fig. 2, there are NCS real CSs with known driving 83
routes from EV origin in each trip, only one of which might 84
be scheduled for EV e. Therefore, each CS is represented by 85
two binary variables in the EV e problem for G2V and V2G 86
operation at each time interval (as shown in Fig. 3). 87
As mentioned before, a mandatory trip should always be 88
accomplished. Let’s consider a mandatory trip in which the 89
most economic decision for EV e is not to be charged nor 90
discharged. In this case, none of the actual CSs should be 91
selected and yet, the battery SOC values should be updated at 92
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the end of the trip and the shortest route should be selected. For1
this purpose,we introduced Virtual CS (VCS) in our model that2
represents the shortest route to reach the destination directly3
from EV’s origin, as shown in Fig. 2. When VCS is selected,4
EV e arrives at the destination from its origin without charging5
or discharging, while it is ensured that the EV’s preferences6
and constraints are satisfied. Hence, G2V and V2G power of7
a VCS in a mandatory trip are equal to zero for EV e. A8
VCS is also needed for EV e in an optional trip to correctly9
model the solution in which neither G2V or V2G services are10
recommended. The only difference between VCS in optional11
and mandatory trips is that the driving route of a VCS is zero12
in the optional trip. Thus, the EV will be idle for that optional13
trip.14













































Fig. 2. A schematic of two mandatory trips and one optional trip for EV e.
B. EV drivers preferences15
In this study, two practical aspects of the EV schedul-16
ing problem are modeled by defining “driver’s cost/revenue17
threshold” and “driver’s route preference” constraints. They18
represent economically-irrational decisions of the EV drivers,19
as explained in the following subsections.20
1) Driver’s cost/revenue threshold21
We are assuming that EV drivers accept an alternative route22
(instead of the shortest route) only if there is an economic23
incentive greater than or equal to the drivers’ expectation.24
When a CS offers a lower price than the nearest CS for25
G2V service, the EV driver accepts it only if the charging26
cost reduction is equal to or more than the driver’s cost27
threshold. Otherwise, the EV driver would prefer to charge28
at the nearest CS although it may be a bit more expensive.29
The same argument can be made during the V2G services,30
where a driver chooses a CS with higher V2G prices over the31
nearest CS only if the increase in revenue is equal to or more32
than the driver’s revenue threshold.33
2) Driver’s route preference34
In addition to the cost/revenue threshold, an EV driver35
may accept a CS other than the nearest CS only when the36
required extra driving distance is equal to or less than “driver’s37
route preference”. In other words, the driver’s route preference38
ensures that not only selecting an alternative route makes sense39
economically to the driver, but also the driver’s desire for not40
being on the road for more than “driver’s route preference” is 41
fulfilled in the scheduling process. 42
Let’s see the two preferences in an example. Consider an EV 43
driver whose “cost/revenue threshold” and “route preference” 44
are $5 and 2 km, respectively. An alternative route will be 45
selected only if the cost-benefit of the alternative route is at 46
least $5 AND the extra driving distance does not go beyond 47
2 km, both in comparison with the nearest CS. 48
Fig. 3. The proposed framework for day-ahead G2V and V2G scheduling
for all stakeholders.
C. The proposed day-ahead scheduling framework/solution 49
The proposed scheduling framework is a hybrid cooperative 50
and non-cooperative Stackelberg game [?]. In each level, play- 51
ers of the same type form coalitions, i.e., one coalition between 52
all EVs, another coalition between all CSs, and the third one 53
between retailers. Then, a non-cooperative Stackelberg game 54
forms among the three coalitions (layers). The motivation 55
behind coalition formation between players in each layer is 56
that cooperative game may lead to higher benefits for the 57
coalition members when players objectives are identical [?], 58
[?]. Also, the nature of the problem justifies the existence of 59
leader and follower in the higher level game, which leads to a 60
non-cooperative Stackelberg game. Typically, three- or n-level 61
non-cooperative games are solved using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker 62
(KKT) optimality condition or strong duality theorem by 63
replacing the lower level problem with a set of constraints 64
in the upper level problem. In this paper, however, the lower 65
level problem is a mixed-integer quadratic program, which 66
doesn’t satisfy the KKT optimality condition. Even if there 67
was a differentiable objective function and constraints in the 68
lower level, formulating the complementarity conditions of the 69
lower level in the middle-level problem would result in a non- 70
convex optimisation problem [?], [?]. 71
In this study, we adopted an iterative approach to solve the 72
Stackelberg game, which is common in three-level games in 73
the literature [?], [?]. The solution of this formulation provides 74
a Nash equilibrium, although the uniqueness and existence of 75
Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed [?], [?]. 76
As shown in Fig. 4, the electricity prices, estimated using 77
historical wholesale market prices, are generated by retailers 78
in the first iteration. Then, the prices will be given to the CS 79
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layer. In this iteration, the prices will be modified by adding1
CSs’ profit margin. Afterwards, CSs’ prices will be passed2
on to EV layer where the first optimization problem will be3
solved in the first iteration. Please note that the prices for V2G4
services are also estimated by the CS layer in the first iteration.5
In the EV layer, the decision variables are EVs’ power during6
G2V and V2G operation, and CS selection for each trip (as7
shown in Fig. 3). The optimal solutions (i.e., G2V and V2G8
power of EVs and optimal CSs) for this iteration are sent back9
to the CS layer, where its optimization problem is solved.10
The optimal solutions in the CS layer are electricity prices for11
V2G service, power generation of onsite CGU and PV system,12
power purchased from retailers, charging/discharging power13
and operation mode of stationary ESS and optimal retailers14
for each CS. Afterwards, the EV layer problem will be solved15
with the updated V2G prices and new EV and CS schedules16
will be obtained. The inner loop (see Fig 4) will continue17
between CS and EV layers until the convergence criterion of18
the optimization problems in the CS layer is satisfied for the19
given retailers’ prices. Since the aggregator operation is not20
modelled in this paper, the same V2G prices from the first21
iteration will be used in the inner loop. Upon convergence of22
the inner loop in the first iteration (of the outer loop), optimal23
solutions (i.e., selected retailers and power purchased from24
each) are passed on to Retailer layer. Then, an optimization25
problem is solved to identify new electricity prices offered by26
retailers to CSs according to the reactions of CSs and EVs to27
original prices. Second iteration of the outer loop starts with28
the new Retailers’ prices (see Fig 4). The iterative process29
will be terminated when the change in the relevant objective30
functions in the last two iterations for both inner and outer31
loops is less than or equal to 0.001.32
III. MATHEMATICAL MODELING33
A. Optimization problem in the EV layer34
The objective function of EV e is the net cost of EV
operation to be minimized. It is the difference between cost
of EV e and the revenue from selling electricity to CS i in
V2G mode. The cost of EV e comprises electricity purchased
from CS i in G2V mode and battery degradation cost (the term
inside the bracket of Eq. (1)). We used the battery capacity
degradation model from [?], which works for any arbitrary
battery charging/discharging profile and captures the impact of
battery SOC and charge/discharge power levels. As a result,
EVs will be scheduled for V2G services only if they can
recover the cost of battery degradation and make a profit.
During G2V operation, the battery degradation model ensures
that EVs won’t be charged excessively unless the benefits
of low G2V prices exceed the extra degradation cost of the
battery. Please note that the objective function of the coalition
Input data
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the three-layer optimization problem.

















SOCt,e − a · (Γt,e,i + Πt,e,i)
)2






























∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ S
(1b)
SOCe ≤ SOCt,e ≤ SOCe ∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E (1c)
SOCT,e ≥ SOCende ∀e ∈ E (1d)
0 ≤ X+t,e,i ≤ E
CH
i .Γt,e,i ∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ S (1e)
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0 ≤ X−t,e,i ≤ E
CH
i .Πt,e,i ∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ S (1f)
S∑
i=1
(Πt,e,i + Γt,e,i) ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E (1g)∑
e∈E
(Γt,e,i + Πt,e,i) ≤ N
CH



















∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ S
(1j)
Γt,e,i.(Ot,e,i +Dt,e,i)≤ (D̂Ot,e +Ke).Γt,e,i
∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ S
(1k)
Πt,e,i.(Ot,e,i +Dt,e,i)≤ (D̂Ot,e +Ke).Πt,e,i
∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ S
(1l)
X+t,e,i= 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i = V CS (1m)
X−t,e,i= 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀e ∈ E,∀i = V CS (1n)
Ot,e,i +Dt,e,i= ζt,e∀t ∈ (T − F ),∀e ∈ E,∀i = V CS (1o)
Ot,e,i +Dt,e,i= 0 ∀t ∈ F,∀e ∈ E,∀i = V CS (1p)
SOC of EV e after each charge and discharge is calculated1
by Eq. (1b), while Eq. (1c) ensures that the SOC level is2
maintained within a lower and upper bound at all times. The3
SOC of EV e must be greater than or equal to the desired SOC4
level specified by the driver at the end of the day, as expressed5
in Eq. (1d). Maximum and minimum charging and discharging6
capacity of the chargers at CS i are enforced by Eqs. (1e) and7
(1f). Sum of the binary variables of CSs must be less or equal8
to one for EV e in order to select one CS for either G2V or9
V2G operation at time t, imposed by Eq. (1g). Equation (1h)10
ensures that the number of used chargers in a CS during G2V11
and V2G operation does not exceed the number of existing12
chargers. Equations (1i) and (1j) enforce drivers’ cost/revenue13
preferences. Based on Eq. (1i), an EV will be assigned an14
alternative CS from the nearest CS only if the driver’s cost15
reduction is greater than or equal to her/his expected cost16
reduction. In V2G mode, Eq. (1j) guarantees a minimum17
incentive greater than or equal to drivers’ revenue expectation18
for a CS that is not on the shortest route. Equations (1k) and19
(1l) enforce the driver’s route preference in G2V and V2G20
mode, respectively. In this case, an alternative route will be21
selected only if the extra driving distance (in comparison with22
the shortest route) is less than or equal to the specified value.23
Equations (1m) and (1n) set the VCSs’ G2V and V2G power24
to zero. Based on Eq. (1o), the driving route assigned to VCS25
for the mandatory trip is equal to the shortest route to reach26
the destination directly from EV’s origin. Equation (1p) set27
the driving route distance to zero between the EV and VCS28
in the optional trips.29
B. Optimization problem in CS layer30
The objective function of CS i is the net revenue of the CS.
The revenue of CS i comes from selling electricity to EV e
and aggregator during G2V and V2G operation, respectively.
We assumed that the electricity purchased from EV e is equal
to the electricity sold to the aggregator. The expenses of CS
i consists of onsite operational costs [?] and cost of energy
purchased from retailer r and EV e during G2V and V2G
services, respectively. Due to the coalition between CSs, the






























































+ Y +t,i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S, r ∈ R
(2b)
0 ≤ Y GUt,i ≤ E
GU
i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S (2c)
0 ≤ Y PVt,i ≤ E
PV
i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S (2d)
0 ≤ Y ret,i,r ≤ Ei.βt,i,r ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S, r ∈ R (2e)
R∑
r=1
βt,i,r ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S (2f)
0 ≤ Y +t,i ≤ E
ESS
i .ψt,i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S (2g)
0 ≤ Y −t,i ≤ E
ESS










≤ SOCESSi ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S
(2i)
ρ− ≤ ρ−t,i ≤ ρ
− ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ S (2j)
During G2V and V2G operation, the power balance between 31
supply and demand at CS i will be maintained at all times by 32
Eq. (2b). Therefore, the total power produced by PV system, 33
CGU, stationary ESS during discharging, and power purchased 34
from retailer r and EVs must be equal to the total power 35
demand, including power of stationary ESS in charging mode, 36
power sold to the aggregator and EVs during V2G considering 37
chargers’ efficiency. CGU and PV upper and lower capacity 38
limits at CS i are enforced in Eqs. (2c) and (2d), respectively. 39
The power purchased from retailer r is limited by Eq. (2e). 40
βt,i,r is a binary variable showing if retailer r is selected by 41
CS i. Equation (2f) ensures that only one retailer is selected 42
by CS i at time t. Charging and discharging power of the 43
stationary ESS at CS i are enforced by Eqs. (2g) and (2h). 44
The upper and lower limits of ESS’ SOC in CS i at time t are 45
guaranteed by Eq. (2i). The electricity prices offered by CS i 46
to EV e for V2G services are confined by Eq. (2j). 47
C. Optimization problem in Retailer layer 48
The objective function in this layer is the net revenue of
all retailers to be maximized in the coalition. It includes the
difference between revenue obtained by selling electricity to
CS i, and the cost of electricity purchased from the wholesale
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Pm,n,t= gm,n.(1 + ∆V̂m,t).(∆Vm,t −∆Vn,t)
−bm,n.(θm,t − θn,t) ∀m,n ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T
(3d)
Qm,n,t= −bm,n.(1 + ∆V̂m,t).(∆Vm,t −∆Vn,t)
−gm,n.(θm,t − θn,t) ∀m,n ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T
(3e)
Vm,t = 1 + ∆Vm,t ∀m ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T (3f)
θm,t = 0 + ∆θm,t ∀m ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T (3g)
∆V m ≤ ∆Vm,t ≤ ∆V m ∀m ∈ B (3h)
Pm,n ≤ Pm,n,t ≤ Pm,n ∀m,n ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T (3i)
Q
m,n
≤ Qm,n,t ≤ Qm,n ∀m,n ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T (3j)
ρre ≤ ρret,r ≤ ρre ∀t ∈ T, ∀r ∈ R (3k)
Equations (3b) and (3c) maintain the balance of active1
and reactive power at all times. Thus, sum of the electricity2
purchased from wholesale electricity market through retailer r3
must be equal to the electricity purchased by CS i from retailer4
r for active and reactive power at time t. Equations (3d) and5
(3e) represent real and reactive power flows in the network6
based on voltage magnitude and angle deviations [?]. Voltages7
and angles deviations are obtained by Eqs. (3f) and (3g). Equa-8
tion (3h) guarantees that bus voltages are within permissible9
range. Active and reactive power of the line are constrained10
by Eqs. (3i) and (3j). The electricity prices offered by retailers11
are limited by Eq. (3k) based on their profit margin.12
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS13
To assess the effectiveness of the proposed model and the14
impact of new practical constraints and optional trips on the15
solutions, a comprehensive simulation study is carried out.16
The first simulation model contains three retailers, nine CSs,17
and 600 EVs in San Francisco, the USA, and IEEE 37-bus18
distribution test system. Without loss of generality, all CSs19
are assumed to have 30 bidirectional fast DC chargers (50kW).20
Other simulation parameters are:21
• A 65 kW CGU for each CS;22
• 16kW, 19.2kW, 24kW, 27.2kW, and 32kW of PV systems23
randomly assigned to CSs;24
• Five one-hour ESS with the capacity of 45kW, 50kW,25
65kW, 70kW, and 85kW randomly assigned to CSs;26
• Four types of EVs with battery capacity of 14.5kWh,27
16kWh, 28kWh, and 40kWh are considered; and28
• The initial SOC of EVs is randomly generated between29
10% and 95% with mean value of 28%; and30
• The desired SOC of EVs at the end of day specified by31
the drivers is randomly selected between 70% and 90%.32
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that each EV plans33
two mandatory trips and one optional trip in a typical day. The34
first mandatory trip of 90% of EVs in the fleet is randomly35
scheduled between 06:00 to 10:00. The optional trip of 90% of 36
EVs is randomly planned between 11:00 to 15:00. Finally, the 37
second mandatory trip of 90% of EVs is assumed to take place 38
between 16:00 to 20:00. The shortest routes between origin of 39
EV e, location of CS i, and destination of EV e for each trip 40
are determined by ArcGIS® prior to optimization. Since end- 41
users should pay network maintenance costs, ancillary services 42
costs, taxes, and etc., the day-ahead electricity prices of the 43
wholesale market (California ISO [?]) is multiplied by 4.5 44
homogeneously to obtain the prices offered to the CS operators 45
by the retailers. The profit margin of the retailers is assumed 46
to be 5-30%, while the CSs profit margin is varied between 47
10% to 30%. In addition, electricity prices offered for the V2G 48
service is between 60-85% less than prices offered by retailers. 49
The electricity prices sold to the aggregator by CSs is 10% 50
more than what CSs pay for V2G service to the EV owners. 51
Four simulation scenarios are defined, see Table I, to assess 52
the impact of optional trips and EV drivers’ preferences on 53
the cost/revenue of all stakeholders, explained in subsections 54
IV-A and IV-B. The optimization problems are solved by 55
Branch-and-Bound method using Gurobi® solver in Python 56
on a laptop with Intel Core i7 CPU with 1.80GHz processor 57
and 8GB RAM. The MIP optimality gap is set to 0.0001 for 58
all optimization problems. 59
A larger ecosystem with 1000 EVs, 18 CSs, and three 60
retailers on IEEE 69-bus distribution test system is also 61
simulated, where the simulation parameters and results are 62
explained in Section IV-E. 63
TABLE I
DIFFERENT SIMULATION SCENARIOS






TOTAL DAILY NET COST AND REVENUE OF THE STAKEHOLDERS WITH
MIP OPTIMALITY GAP












1153.4 (0.0097%) 256.4 (0%) 958.1 (0%)
s2
1000.1 (0.002%) 418.9 (0%) 1333.9 (0%)
s3
1240.5 (0%) 238.0 (0%) 1040.5 (0%)
s4
1118.8 (0.0044%) 389.4 (0%) 1382.6 (0%)
TABLE III
TOTAL NUMBER OF CHARGED AND DISCHARGED EVS
Total # of EVs # of EVs charged (discharged)Scenario Charged Discharged Mandatory trips Optional trip
s1 688 32 434 (30) 254 (2)
s2 739 327 448 (320) 291 (7)
s3 566 27 566 (27) –
s4 556 297 556 (297) –
A. The impact of optional trips 64
In order to quantify the significance of optional trips on the 65
net cost of EVs and the net revenue of CSs and retailers, 66
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s1 and s2 can be compared with s3 with s4, respectively.1
Table II shows the cost/revenue of each stakeholder obtained in2
each scenario, where the total net cost of EVs decreased from3
$1240.5 to $1153.4 and the total revenue of CSs increased4
from $238.0 in s3 to $256.4 in s1. The reduction in retailers’5
revenue is due to less PV curtailment at CSs (see Fig. 8) in6
s1 and thus less energy purchase from the retailers by the7
CSs. Also, it can be seen from Table III that the number8
of EVs participated in G2V (V2G) increased from 566 (27)9
in s3 to 688 (32) in s1, and from 556 (297) in s4 to 73910
(327) in s2. The impact of optional trips on the congestion11
can be seen in Fig. 5, where more EVs are scheduled to12
charge in the middle of the day rather than early morning.13
A similar pattern has been observed by comparing scenarios14
s1 and s3. It shows that the consideration of optional trips15
can eliminate/reduce G2V congestion during the hours of16
mandatory trips, which consequently affect power system17
operation as a whole by avoiding new peaks and voltage issues,18
although its impact on V2G is negligible. The optimal hourly19
averaged electricity prices offered by retailers and CSs during20
V2G and G2V operation for scenario s1 are shown in Fig. 6.21
Since unique prices will be obtained for each stakeholder in22
this framework, only stakeholders with non-zero prices in an23
hour are considered in the hourly average calculation. Zero24
price in an hour shows that no G2V or V2G activity was25
scheduled in that hour. The prices in Fig. 6 are aligned with26
the G2V and V2G operation in Fig. 5. Note that the higher27
G2V prices of CSs from 18:00 to 21:00 is consistent with high28
V2G prices of CSs and zero prices of retailers to encourage29
services to the grid by EVs.30
G2V V2G























Fig. 5. Number of EVs charged and discharged under s2 and s4.
G2V V2G
































Retailers to CSs 
CSs to EVs 
CSs to Aggregator 
EVs to CSs 
1 3 5 7 9   11  13  15 17  19  21  23
Fig. 6. Optimal hourly average electricity prices of the stakeholders in s1
The number of EVs who selected VCS during V2G and31
G2V operation in the mandatory and optional trips is shown32
in Fig. 7 in s1. EVs selected VCS 347 times during optional33
trips, which means that they didn’t participate in either G2V34
or V2G program in those hours. Also, EVs are not scheduled35
for G2V or V2G 766 times during mandatory trips (176 EV 36
in the first mandatory and 590 in the second mandatory trip) 37
in a day of simulation. In the remaining 687 times, EVs have 38
been scheduled for either G2V or V2G operation. 39
G2V V2G




























Fig. 7. Number of EVs selected VCS during V2G and G2V operation in s1.
The impact of optional trips on the total PV curtailment is 40
shown in Fig. 8 for CS#1, CS#2, and CS#6, where considering 41
optional trips led to significant reduction (49.8%, 16.3%, and 42
13%, respectively,) in PV curtailment. In other CSs, no PV 43










































Fig. 8. CS#1, CS#2, and CS#6 PV curtailment in scenario s1 and s3.
B. The impact of EV drivers’ travel preferences 45
In this subsection, the impact of drivers’ cost/revenue and 46
extra driving distance preferences are investigated. The sim- 47
ulation results in Table II show that when the constraints 48
in Eqs. (1i), (1j), (1k), and (1l) are enforced, the total net 49
cost of EVs increased from $1000.1 in s2 to $1153.4 in s1. 50
Also, the total net revenue of CSs and retailers decreased 51
from $418.9 and $1333.9 in s2 to $256.4 and $958.1 in s1, 52
respectively. Also, Fig. 9 shows that significantly fewer EVs 53
participated in the V2G program due to drivers’ preferences. 54
In particular, the number of EVs participated in V2G increased 55
from 32 in s1 to 327 in s2, and from 27 in s3 to 297 in s4. 56
Therefore, eliminating these preferences leads to significant 57
overestimation of the G2V and V2G services and revenue of 58
retailers and CS, and underestimation of EV’s costs. 59
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Fig. 9. Number of EVs in G2V and V2G operation in s3 and s4.
C. The impact of V2G services1
To show the impact of V2G services, the iterative three-layer2
optimization problems is solved in all scenarios by eliminating3
V2G services from the framework. A comparison between4
Table II and Table IV reveals 6.8% increase in the total net cost5
of EVs on average, and 26.5% and 16.2% decrease in the total6
net revenue of CSs and retailers on average, respectively, in7
the absence of V2G services. It depicted the sheer magnitude8
of V2G impact on the financial interests of all stakeholders in9
the ecosystem.10
TABLE IV
TOTAL DAILY NET COST AND REVENUE OF THE STAKEHOLDERS AFTER
ELIMINATING V2G SERVICE






s1 1166.1 (0%) 245.8 (0%) 941.3 (0%)
s2 1154.7 (0.007%) 242 (0%) 933.7 (0%)
s3 1250 (0%) 235.1 (0%) 1037.4 (0%)
s4 1249 (0%) 234.1 (0%) 1037.7 (0%)
D. The impact of three-layer iterative optimization11
Table V shows a comparison between cost/revenue of three12
stakeholders for two different cases as defined below:13
 Case I: This the case in which the proposed three-14
layer optimization problem is solved iteratively to find15
equilibrium based on the flowchart in Fig. 4.16
 Case II: The optimization problems in the three layers17
are solved individually, not iteratively. Thus, G2V and18
V2G prices are not updated and the impact of G2V prices19
offered by retailers and V2G prices offered by CSs are20
not considered.21
Similar optional trips and EV drivers’ preferences are con-22
sidered in both cases. It can be observed in Table V that the23
total net cost of EVs in Case II increased by 1.65% and the24
total net revenue of CSs and retailers decreased by 22.5%25
and 3.95%, respectively, compared to Case I. It should be26
mentioned that when the optimization problems in the three27
layers are solved individually, fewer EVs participated in G2V28
and the V2G program, which led to significant decrease in the29
total net revenue of CSs.30
TABLE V
TOTAL NET COST AND REVENUE OF ALL STAKEHOLDERS IN s1
Cost/Revenue Case I Case II
Total net cost of EVs ($) 1153.4 1172.4
Total net revenue of CSs ($) 256.4 198.7
Total net revenue of retailers ($) 958.1 920.3
The optimization algorithms convergence for the three lay-31
ers is shown in Fig. 10 in scenario s1, where optimal results32



































































Fig. 10. (a) EV layer, (b) CS layer, and (c) Retailer layer objective function
values at different iterations
E. Scalability and convergence of the proposed solution 34
In this section, a larger e-mobility ecosystem with 1000 35
EVs, 18 CSs, three retailers on the IEEE 69-bus distribution 36
test system is designed to show the scalability of the proposed 37
solution. In this simulation study, the first mandatory trip of 38
88.5% of EVs in the fleet is randomly scheduled between 39
06:00 to 10:00. The optional trip of 85% of EVs is ran- 40
domly planned between 11:00 to 15:00. Finally, the second 41
mandatory trip of 76.8% of EVs is assumed to take place 42
between 16:00 to 20:00. Simulation parameters of CSs and 43
EVs are identical to the first simulation study with 600 EVs. 44
The optimal results are obtained after only 19 iterations of the 45
outer loop in 113 minutes on average. The total net cost of 46
EVs and total net revenue of CSs and retailers for all scenarios 47
are given in Table VI. It shows that the proposed solution can 48
manage to solve scheduling problem of a larger ecosystem in 49
a reasonable time. The trends in the cost and revenue changes 50
of the stakeholders from one scenario to another are similar 51
to those observed in the smaller ecosystem in Section IV-A. 52
TABLE VI
TOTAL DAILY NET COST AND REVENUE OF THE STAKEHOLDERS FOR
LARGER E-MOBILITY ECOSYSTEM









s1 1653.2 (0%) 400.8 (0.0015%) 1422.61 (0%)
s2 1413.3 (0.0083%) 649.3 (0%) 1960.8 (0%)
s3 2050.1 (0.0096%) 375.5 (0.0016%) 1545.5(0%)
s4 1986.7 (0.0041%) 417.2 (0%) 1612.1 (0%)
Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis is performed for 10 53
cases with different simulation parameters to demonstrate the 54
convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm. The simula- 55
tion parameters (# of EVs and CSs and trips planning) are 56
presented in Table VII. The total net cost of EVs and total 57
net revenue of CSs and retailers as well as the corresponding 58
relative MIP Gap are reported in Table VII for s1. In Fig. 11, 59
the convergence rates for total net cost of EVs and optimal 60
total net revenue of CSs and retailers are illustrated. The 61
average computation time for c1-c6 and c7-c10 was 39 and 62
115 minutes, respectively. It can be seen that the proposed 63
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solution solved all cases in a reasonable time with a near-zero1
relative MIP gap.2
V. CONCLUSION3
In this study, a comprehensive day-ahead scheduling frame-4
work is proposed for the future e-mobility ecosystem includ-5
ing EVs, CSs, and retailers by considering both G2V and V2G6
operation. Two kinds of trips, namely mandatory and optional7
trips, as well as EV drivers’ preferences are formulated to8
enhance practical aspects of the proposed algorithm. The9
proposed tool finds the best CS for EV’s G2V and V2G10
operation and the best retailers for CSs to purchase electricity.11
Also, electricity prices offered by CSs for G2V and V2G12
services and optimal charging and discharging scheduling of13
EVs are determined considering the impacts of prices offered14
by retailers through a three layer optimization problem. An it-15
erative solution is proposed to solve the three-level Stackelberg16
game. Simulation results confirm the value of optional trips to17
reduce total cost of EVs and congestion at CSs during early18
morning peak. Furthermore, the proposed scheduling system19
helped to reduce the cost of EVs and to increase the revenue of20
CSs and retailers. The drivers’ preferences are proven to have21
an immense impact on the solutions and financial benefits of22
the stakeholders. In the future study, we plan to model different23
sources of uncertainties, e.g., EV drivers and PV generation,24
and solve a stochastic optimization.25
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Fig. 11. Objective function values of (a) EV layer, (b) CS layer, and (c) Retailer layer for cases c1 to c10
TABLE VII
SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND THE TOTAL DAILY NET COST AND REVENUE OF THE STAKEHOLDERS FOR CASES c1 TO c10
Total # of % of EVs






















c1 600 9 90% 70% 37-bus system 10-95% (28%) 1162.3 (0%) 255.3 (0%) 954.3 (0%)
c2 600 9 65% 80% 37-bus system 25-95% (38%) 783.0 (0.0072%) 208.1 (0%) 671.7 (0%)
c3 600 9 94% 80% 37-bus system 10-95% (28%) 1161.2 (0%) 255 (0%) 956.1 (0%)
c4 600 9 90% 70% 37-bus system 15-100% (56%) 345 (0%) 169.8 (0%) 389.6 (0%)
c5 600 9 94% 60% 37-bus system 15-86% (36%) 835.8 (0.0078%) 194.8 (0.0089%) 676.3 (0%)
c6 600 9 70% 90% 37-bus system 10-74% (37%) 769.3 (0%) 211.6 (0%) 685.8 (0%)
c7 600 9 60% 60% 37-bus system 25-95% (38%) 789.9 (0%) 201 (0%) 659.2 (0%)
c8 1000 18 75% 65% 69-bus system 10-100% (33%) 1655.5 (0.009%) 397.5 (0.0015%) 1408.4 (0%)
c9 1000 18 65% 55% 69-bus system 10-80% (30%) 1806.2 (0.0082%) 400.5 (0%) 1500.6 (0%)
c10 1000 18 55% 45% 69-bus system 10-70% (27%) 1930.4 (0.0077%) 407.9 0.0056% 1597.1 (0%)
